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THE INDIGENOUS PUBLIC SPHERE
DR EVAN TE AHU POATA-SMITH
is a lecturer in the School of
Sociology and Anthropology,
University of Canterbury
The veneer is
radical, but the
substance is not
Ka Whawhai Tonu Matou: Struggle
Without End (Revised Edition), by
Ranginui Walker. Auckland: Penguin
Books, 2004. 462 pp. ISBN 0143019457.
RANGINUI WALKER’S historyof the Maori struggles
for tino rangatiratanga
 (self-determination) was first pub-
lished during New Zealand’s
sesquicentennial year. The 150th an-
niversary of the signing of the Treaty
of Waitangi provoked intense public
debates around issues of nationhood
and the place of the Treaty of in man-
aging contemporary relationships be-
tween Maori communities and the
Crown.
Ka Whawhi Tonu Matou repre-
sented a challenge to the more sani-
tised versions of history that tended
to present New Zealand as a harmo-
nious and progressive nation in a
world otherwise characterised by in-
cessant ethnic conflict, racism and
division. This romanticism, originally
encapsulated in Hobson’s decree at
the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi
that New Zealand was ‘one nation,
one people’, had become firmly en-
trenched in the consciousness of
many New Zealanders.
Walker clearly demonstrates that
underlying this patriotism and rheto-
ric of national unity is a more sinis-
ter version of our national history,
predicated on notions of European
superiority, racism and the destruc-
tion of the territorial and cultural in-
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tegrity of indigenous communities.
With the proliferation of revision-
ist histories in the 1980s, there were
those who objected to the re-evalua-
tion of New Zealand’s past on the
basis of contemporary moral stand-
ards and political perspectives. These
critical histories were depicted by
some as ‘bullying books…in which
the past [was] ransacked to provide
illustrations in support of a position
in our current debates about either
racism or sexism’ (Stead, 1989, p.
124). Others argued that racism was
no longer a central factor shaping the
lives of Maori in contemporary New
Zealand society. The violent history
of colonisation, the systematic dis-
possession of Maori land and re-
sources were the product of the 19th
century and not the enlightened
present.
As the celebratory activities
planned by the government-appointed
1990 Commission became a rallying
point for both Maori and Pakeha pro-
testers, Maori were often accused of
being ‘hypersensitive’ or of using rac-
ism as an ‘excuse’. In this way, an
ill-informed general public increas-
ingly viewed the upsurge in Maori an-
ger and discontent from the late 1960s
onwards as being stirred up by a few
Maori extremists on the fringes of an
otherwise harmonious society who
were simply acting against the ‘na-
tional interest’. ‘Ordinary New Zea-
landers’ on the other hand, were pre-
sented as passive victims whose
rights were being trampled on in this
process. The popularity of this view
demonstrates how a direct appeal to
nationalist sentiments is an enduring
feature of contemporary public de-
bates that depict Maori claims for
greater autonomy as being inherently
divisive. Indeed, the infamous
shibboleth, ‘we’re all New Zealand-
ers’, has frequently been employed to
deny legitimacy to Maori struggles
for the return of land, a greater share
of society’s resources and an active
role in formal decision-making.
These political sentiments have
been resurrected more recently by the
National Party leader, Don Brash. In
a move clearly designed to tap into
public resentment, Brash has claimed
that the Treaty of Waitangi is an ar-
chaic relic of the past and on that ba-
sis should possess no more than a
symbolic role in contemporary soci-
ety. He has argued that references to
the Treaty in government legislation
represented ‘a dangerous drift to ra-
cial separatism’ which undermined
‘the essential notion of one rule for
all in a single nation state’ (Brash,
2004).
In advocating a return to the ‘one
nation, one people’ paradigm for
‘managing’ national issues in New
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Zealand, Brash has articulated, ‘a pre-
vailing view, and one that is still
widely held … that majority groups
conduct their public and private lives
according to universally held and su-
perior systems and values. The insti-
tutions of which they are part, what
they believe, and how they act are not
culturally bound, but are viewed as
natural, normal, and necessary’
(Fleras & Spoonley, 1999, p. 81).
Walker has clearly demonstrated
throughout his book, however, that
New Zealand’s societal institutions
are not culturally or politically neu-
tral with respect to iwi, hapu and ur-
ban Maori communities. Indeed, New
Zealand society is inescapably rooted
in Eurocentric, capitalist values that
are reflected in, and perpetuated
through, the major institutions of the
state.
Significantly, Walker’s book did
not represent a new history of New
Zealand. Its initial success lay in the
way it collated a disparate series of
historical events that had shaped
Maori communities into an assess-
able, thematically coherent, single
volume. Up to that point the strug-
gles of indigenous communities were
largely confined to the margins – ei-
ther in oral histories that were inac-
cessible for a wider public auidence
or in relatively obscure publications
for small, academic readerships –
rather than the general, popular his-
tories of New Zealand that make the
best sellers’ lists.
Like many of the Maori students
mentioned in Walker’s preface to the
revised edition, I navigated the tur-
bulence of my undergraduate years at
university eagerly clutching my copy
of Ka whawhai tonu matou as if it
were a kind of literary antidote to the
pervasive Eurocentrism that charac-
terised campus life and wider soci-
ety! The overwhelming strength of
Walker’s account lay in its emphasis
on the rediscovery of the role of
Maori in history, not just as victims
but as active agents who consciously
contributed to the making of New
Zealand history –  even if they did so
in circumstances not of their own
choosing. For those of us who had
spent our secondary school history
classes in a quest for a deeper under-
standing of Elizabethan England or
the Battle of Britain – this was a re-
freshing, exciting and even subver-
sive history. It was our own history
of struggle and resistance.
While Walker successfully shat-
ters the assimilative ideologies that
have underpinned government policy
with respect to Maori for well over a
century, he has constructed his own
mythology in its place. This is par-
ticularly apparent in the revised edi-
tion which includes two additional
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chapters that extend the coverage of
events beyond 1990 to the present
day.  Although it appears as a simple
(at times disorganised) narrative of
key events, the focus of the additional
chapters has been clearly constrained
by the analytical assumptions and
ideological values of ‘cultural nation-
alism’ – one of the competing factions
that exists within the broader Maori
political milieu.
The notion that all Maori share
an overpowering and innate attach-
ment based on blood, culture and lan-
guage, is a critical ingredient in ‘cul-
tural nationalist’ political ideology
and practice, which emphasises the
fundamental commonality of Maori
interests in contemporary capitalist
society. Throughout his book, Walker
tends to present the political interests
of Maori as if they are unitary despite
the overwhelming evidence to the
contrary. For instance, Walker has
claimed that essentially both ‘radical’
and ‘conservative’ elements of the
Maori protest movement pursued the
same objectives although the meth-
ods they used differed (Walker, 2004,
p. 243).
This interpretation, however,
simply ignores the political realities
that continue to shape contemporary
Maori communities. In fact, Maori
protest politics embraces a range of
conflicting political ideologies, which
are informed by radically different as-
sumptions about the causes of racism
and Maori inequality in wider soci-
ety, and in turn, different sets of strat-
egies for ameliorating and transcend-
ing that inequality. Far from being the
subject of political unanimity then,
tino rangatiratanga is a fundamentally
contested concept. Who exercises this
power and to what end?
While it is certainly an expres-
sion of pride and revolt against soci-
ety’s assimilative pressures, it is sig-
nificant that tino rangatiratanga has
meant quite different things to differ-
ent people. While some have drawn
radical Maori nationalist conclusions,
others have interpreted the idea quite
differently. Indeed, the slogan as it
evolved over the last two decades has
become the catalyst for both a move
to the left and a sharp move to the
right. In the period from the early
1970s onwards, four interconnected
interpretations were to emerge: tino
rangatiratanga as Maori capitalism (in
tribal or individual form), tino
rangatiratanga as Maori electoral
power (primarily through the ortho-
dox parliamentary system), tino
rangatiratanga as cultural national-
ism, and tino rangatiratanga as in-
volving more radical far-reaching
strategies for change.
Throughout Walker’s historical
narrative, the existence of the con-
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flicting political ideologies, contra-
dictory class interests and the in-
equalities of wealth and political
power that are entrenched within and
across iwi, hapu and urban Maori
communities have been conveniently
disregarded in favour of an approach
that emphasises the primacy of cul-
tural conflict between Maori and
Pakeha. Maori communities have,
therefore, been typically portrayed as
cultural communities united in their
resistance to hostile ‘Pakeha’ values
or ‘Pakeha society’ (Greenland,
1991).
There is also an implicit tendency
throughout the book to assume the
existence of a unitary, homogeneous
Pakeha society that confronts Maori
and in doing so is fundamentally hos-
tile to what is rather loosely framed
‘Maori interests’. For Walker, the or-
ganisational policies and practices of
the state operate in the interests of
Pakeha in the struggle against Maori
for control over social, economic and
cultural resources because, ‘Pakeha
values and assumptions underlie all
procedures and practices’ (Nairn &
Nairn, 1981, p. 117).
The insistence that Maori are a
culture, united in their resistance
against Pakeha, ignores the critical di-
visions that have arisen within and
between iwi, hapu and urban Maori
communities over the allocation and
distribution of the benefits of the
Treaty of Waitangi settlement proc-
ess, a process that has resulted in a
substantial shift in resources and
compensation to those sections of
Maori society already wealthy and
powerful.
While Walker is correct to assert
that successive governments have
been responsible for establishing a
settlement framework that locks
Maori self-determination into a free-
market, capitalist economic frame-
work, he fails to recognise that this
strategy has been effective precisely
because it has appealed to the mate-
rial interests of those representing
tribal corporations and Maori busi-
nesses whose profitability has been
enhanced by such reforms.
The book tends to be uncritical,
therefore, of the neo-traditionalist
ideologies that present these devel-
opments as reviving traditional, non-
exploitative communal relations of
production within iwi and hapu (see
Rata, 2000). This ignores the way the
Treaty settlement process has con-
cealed the underlying exploitative
class character of tribal capitalism
and institutionalised the inequalities
of wealth and political power that
exist within and across contemporary
Maori society.
Unfortunately, the conflicting in-
terests that exist within contemporary
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Maori communities and the radically
different ways Maori life experiences
have been shaped through the com-
plex articulations of racism, coloni-
alism, ethnicity, class, and gender
vanish from Walker’s narrative. In his
discussion of the government’s ‘Clos-
ing the Gaps’ initiative for instance
(pp. 319-321), Walker either ignores,
or is unwilling to acknowledge, the
fact that the neo-liberal reforms and
the growing social inequalities in
New Zealand society have not af-
fected all Maori equally. Those Maori
representing tribal corporations and
commercial interests have directly
benefited from the pro-business, neo-
liberal agenda that was implemented
to restore the conditions for profitable
capital accumulation in the New Zea-
land economy from 1984 onwards.
They have benefited from the reduc-
tion in corporate taxation levels that
was achieved through large cuts in
welfare expenditure, the commer-
cialisation of health, housing and edu-
cation.
On the other hand, the disman-
tling of the welfare state, the cuts to
benefit levels and the introduction of
market rents for state housing in the
1990s brought increasing hardship
and poverty for many New Zealand-
ers. Working class Maori have had to
face the prospects of increased pov-
erty, falling real incomes, unemploy-
ment, deteriorating employment con-
ditions and job security, social wel-
fare cuts and user-charges for educa-
tion and health services. So, while
those Maori representing tribal cor-
porations and commercial interests
have directly benefited from the eco-
nomic policies of successive govern-
ments, the over-representation of
Maori in the working class has meant
that the vast majority of Maori fami-
lies have borne the brunt of the eco-
nomic restructuring.
With the growth of inequality and
social polarisation within Maori com-
munities it is increasingly difficult to
sustain this notion that Maori com-
munities are classless communities
that share the same sets of experi-
ences of inequality and the same po-
litical aspirations. Nevertheless,
Walker  presents the interests of
wealthy Maori entrepreneurs, private
businesses and tribal corporations on
the one hand, and the interests of
Maori beneficiaries and unemployed
on the other hand, as if they are po-
litically, philosophically and cultur-
ally the same. He does not seem to
appreciate that while the compensa-
tion provided as part of the settlement
process and the state’s patronage of
Maori capitalism resulted in an ex-
pansion of opportunities for middle-
class Maori professionals and entre-
preneurs, for the vast majority of
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Maori families these concessions
have never compensated for the re-
pressive anti-working class policies
of governments since 1984 that have
dramatically widened the social and
economic inequalities in New Zea-
land society.
It is critical to acknowledge that
Maori struggles over the past 15 years
have not simply been directed against
Pakeha and the state, but have in-
volved the struggles of ordinary
Maori families for a greater degree
of control over resources within iwi,
hapu and urban Maori communities.
Indeed, the revitalisation of mili-
tant Maori struggles in the 1990s rep-
resented a direct challenge to the
Treaty settlement framework and the
narrow commercial interests of tribal
authorities. It revealed profound lev-
els of discontent with the adoption of
corporate models for the management
and distribution of settlement assets
and exposed the failure of cultural na-
tionalist strategies to provide a real
solution to historical grievances and
Maori inequality in wider society.
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